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Synopsis of Some of the Leading Cases Recently Decided
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals
L., H. & ST. L. R. R. CO. VS. LYONS ET AL.
This case came up on appeal from the Breckenridge Circuit
Court which involved the construction of some parts of what is
known as the child labor law in this state, and settling the question
as to whether or not contributory negligence can be charged to the
child when injured in a prohibited employment. It appears from
the facts in the case, that 'cKinley
Lyons, a boy under fifteen
years of age, employed as a section hand by the appellant company,
was thrown from a hand car on which he was riding with the section crew. The speed of the car while it was going down a heavy
grade, was suddenly arrested by an iron bar that fell from the
ear to the track, and Lyons who was on the front end of the car
working one of the motor levers, was thrown to the track and the
3ar ran over him, inflicting serious and permanent injuries. By provision of sub-section 11 of Section 331A of the Kentucky statutes,
children under sixteen years of age cannot be employed at such
labor, and a fine is imposed' for the violation as the child was so
employed contrary to law. He was injured, and suit was filed for
damages. It appearing that he contributed to some extent to his
own injury, the question arose whether or not the company could
raise that question in its defense. While authorities are cited from
many states, showing that some allow such a plea and others do not,
this court holds this to be the law in this state: "'When a child
is employed in a prohibited occupation, and he is injured while so
employed, the employer cannot defeat recovery upon the ground
that the child assumed the risk or was guilty of contributory
neglect, or that the injury was caused by the act of a fellow
servant."
2. "
here a child is employed in a prohibited employment
the master assumes all the risk of any injury that may happen to
him while engaged in such employment, and the child assumes none,
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and the master cannot set up the defense of assumed risk or contributory negligence."
COPPIN AND THE CITY OF COVINGTON VS. BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF COVINGTON.
This case was appealed from the Kenton Circuit Court growing out of the action of the Board of Education of the City of Covington, in providing for the holding of an election submitting to
the qualified voters of the City of Covington, the question whether
or not there should be issued school improvement bonds in the sum
of $150,000, the proceeds thereof to be used in acquiring a site
and erecting a high school building thereon. The city council
passed the proper ordinance to carry into effect the recommendation submitted to it by the Board of Education. Suit was filed by
Coppin to test the validity of the ordinance, alleging that by the
creation of the indebtedness of $150,000 by the City of Covington,
in addition to the indebtedness already existing, the city would exceed the limit provided by the state constitution regulating the indebtedness of cities of the second class, to which class Covington
belongs.
Is this debt of $150,000 for school purposes that character of
debt contemplated in fixing the constitutional inhibition? If it is
to be considered a part of the city debt the ordinance is invalid.
The law provides for the creation of the Board of Education within
the city limits, and empowers the Board to provide for raising
money to build buildings and operate the schools, and whenever
money is to be raised, the Board makes its recommendations to the
city council, and the council submits the questions to the voters of
the city and provides means for paying the school debts.
The court holds that this is no part of the city debt contemplated in the constitution. It holds that the city as a municipality and the Board of Education are distinct and separate bodies
for the creation and collection of debts, although they embrace the
same territory and made up of the same people and same property,
and must be so treated unless something can be found in the constitution or laws to the contrary. In support of this conclusion
this quotation is used:, "Gray on limitations of taxing power and
public indebtedness, Section 2148, the rule supported by the weight
of authority in other states is said to be: 'Where two or more
municipal corporations or political bodies are wholly or partly coincident in territory they are nevertheless regarded as separate bodies
for tile purpose of constitutional debt limitations, unless the contrary is expressed in the constitution.' " Based upon this and the
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opinion heretofore rendered by this court in case City of Newport
ex parte 141 Ky. 329,, it is held that the city council was only acting as agent for the Board of Education in making provision for
the debt and that the debt was no part of. the city indebtness provided for under the constitution.
RAINS VS. SMITH ET AL.
This suit was filed in the Whitley Circuit Court upon a claim
in damages growing out of the following facts: Smith and his codefendants who were residents of the state of Tennessee, had caused
the arrest of plaintiff Rains, and bad him placed in jail. Rains claims
the arrest and imprisonment were improper and files his suit for
damages.
In this suit the merits of his claim are not in question, but defendants were called to Whitley County to testify when Rains was
brought before the court for trial of the criminal action against him,
and while there they were served with summons, to appear and defend the suit for damage. When this damage suit was called for
trial, tht defendants, without entering their appearance, moved to
quash the service of summons on each of them, "because each of
them was then a citizen and resident of the state of Tennessee, and
had in good faith come into the state of Kentucky, for the sole purpose of testifying and giving evidence in the criminal proceedings
against Raines." In support of the motion each filed his affidavit.
The facts stated in the affidavits being confessed the court dismissed
the petition without prejudice and this appeal was prosecuted by
Raines.
Appellees claim that the lower court should be upheld under
the provisions of Section 542 of the Civil Code, which provides as
follows: "A witness shall not be liable to be sued in a county in
which he does not reside, by being served with a summons in such
county while going, returning or attending in obedience to a subpoena." It was held in case Liun vs. Hagan, 121 Ky. 627, that the
above provision of the code only exempted the witness from the
service of process when he is attending as a witness in a county that
has not by statute the venue of the action. As Whitley County did
have the venue of the action the provisions of Section 542 of the code
would not apply, but the court holds that such exemptions from
service of process only applies to residents of Kentucky. But as
recognized in Linn vs. Hagan it would apply to non-residents, hence
the ruling of the lower court was upheld, and case affirmed.
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C. & 0. RY. CO. VS. PEED.
This case is appealed from the Shelby Circuit Court to reverse
the judgment of that court in case in which this appellee recovered
judgment for $250 in damage done to a car load of cattle received
by appellant at Mt. Sterling, Ky., for shipment to Shelbyville, Ky.
This appellant operates its trains over its own lines from the
West Virginia state line to Lexington and from Lexington to Louisville has a contract with the L. & N. Company by which the trains
of the C. & 0. are to run over the track of the L. & N., but the contract as construed by the companies prohibits the C. & 0. from delivering any freight between Lexington and Louisville that was received by it east of Lexington, and under this construction it is compelled to deliver such freight to the L. & N. at Lexington for delivery at points between Lexington and Louisville.
With this contract existing the C. & 0. received from appellee
a carload of stock at Mt. Sterling for shipment to Shelbyville, a
point between Lexington and Louisville, a point through which the
train which carried the stock from Mt. Sterling to Lexington passed
a fe whours after leaving Aft. Sterling, but the stock was delivered
to the L. & N. at Lexington and carried by it to Shelbyville in a
round about way, and in such carriage the stock was damaged.
The question arises as to the liability of the C. & 0. for the damage done to the stock by the L. & N.
The court holds that the C. & 0. was liable. While under their
own construction of their agreement the L. & N. would be liable.
That construction if correct, would not effect the right of appellee
to recover of appellant under the construction given by the court of
Section 792 of the Kentucky statutes, which provides in substance:
"that when two railroad companies use the same line of roadway in
the operation of their trains, they shall furnish reasonable and
proper facilities for receiving, forwarding and delivering passengers
and property, and that all contracts made between them that interfere with the performance of this duty shall be void."
If the C. & 0. had carried the stock through to Shelbyville from
Lexington the distance would have been 50 miles and the time but
a very few hours at most, but the L. & N. to reach Shelbyville carried the stock by way of Louisville, making the distance 130 miles
and with great delay, which caused the damage. It was therefore
held that such a contract between the two companies for handling
such business was a violation of the statutes and was void, and that
the C. & 0. was directly responsible to the owner of the stock for the
damage done. The case was affirmed.

